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Abstract
Spatially dispersed production and processing, endemic for most agricultural or re-
newable resource markets, causes oligopsonistic competition. The possibility and use
of spatial price discrimination in these markets is well documented. It is also well
known that the location of processors relative to competitors crucially aﬀects the in-
tensity of competition. However, insights regarding the relation between spatial price
discrimination and the spatial diﬀerentiation of ﬁrms are barely present because the
simultaneous investigation of these issues is often intractable analytically. We use com-
putational economics to study these problems under a general theoretical framework.
For instance, we show whether and under which conditions ﬁrms choose to diﬀerenti-
ate their locations and/or price strategies. Results are consistent with observations in
agricultural markets.
Keywords: spatial price competition, spatial diﬀerentiation, price discrimination, com-
putational economics
1. Introduction
Non-negligible transport costs and spatially distributed production are important at-
tributes of most agricultural commodities or renewable resources (e.g., forest, oilseeds
or - with increasing importance - raw materials for bio-energy) and can cause oligop-
sonistic competition (Faminow and Benson, 1990; Löfgren, 1986). For instance, the
location of new ethanol plants in the U.S. is an example of contemporary interest.
New plants emerge in central locations as well as peripheral regions (Figure 1). While
most plants are concentrated in regions with intensive corn production, entrants in
these regions need to compete with established plants which cause input (corn) prices
to increase in tendency (McNew and Griﬃth, 2005). Entrants in less intensiﬁed pro-
duction regions (e.g., along the U.S. east cost) avoid this kind of price competition but
may face higher procurement costs. Abstracting from diﬀerent production densities
and using homogeneous space instead, the only variable of interest are transport costs.
Hence, the problem can be reduced to the trade-oﬀ between minimizing transport costs
by central locations and relaxing price competition by peripheral locations (Beckmann
and Thisse, 1986).
Location theory provides the framework to address these kinds of research questions.
However, spatial competition for a homogeneous input is not necessarily characterized
by the processors’ locations solely. Instead, local market power enables spatial price
discrimination to be used, and processors may choose among a variety of spatial price
1Figure 1. Location of ethanol plants in the U.S.
strategies which diﬀer by the consideration of transport costs within the local price at
the place of production (Löfgren, 1986).
Most models in spatial economics analyze either the ﬁrm’s location or its price
policy while the other is considered exogenous. However, a key variable that inﬂuences
ﬁrms’ decisions regarding the spatial price policy is the competitiveness of a market
measured by the transport costs and distance to competitors (hereafter inter-ﬁrm
distance) relative to the product’s value (Thisse and Vives, 1988; Espinosa, 1992;
Zhang and Sexton, 2001). The inter-ﬁrm distance, in turn, depends on, e.g., the
number of ﬁrms in the region (Economides, 1993; Brenner, 2005) and/or the dimension
of space (Tabuchi, 1994; Irmen and Thisse, 1998; Ansari et al., 1998).
To tackle the interdependencies of spatial pricing and location, i.e., between spatial
price discrimination and spatial diﬀerentiation, we use a general theoretical model
where competition is considered as interplay of the processors’ locations and their
spatial price policies. The latter are deﬁned as linear price distance functions, i.e.,
the local price consists of the price at the processor’s location (mill price) and the
degree of freight absorption (spatial price discrimination). In this way, we represent a
continuum of spatial price policies available to the ﬁrm including the three commonly
studied strategies of spatial competition: free on board (FOB), uniform delivered
(UD), and optimal discriminatory (OD) pricing.1
1 Under UD pricing producers receive the same price irrespective of their location relative to the
processor, while local prices diﬀer exactly by transport costs in the case of FOB (or mill) pricing.
Depending on the form of supply functions OD pricing involves partial freight absorption, i.e.,
local prices diﬀer by an amount less than the actual transport costs.
2Because we analyze a two-dimensional framework of multi-ﬁrm competition, ana-
lytical solutions cannot be obtained. Therefore, we take advantage of recent develop-
ments in the ﬁeld of computational economics and use a simulation technique that is
able to investigate spatial competition as a non-cooperative static game under relaxed
competition. Particularly, we use an agent-based model for a spatial input market
and identify the processors’ decision (regarding location and price policy) by genetic
algorithm learning (GA) of equilibrium strategies.
Among other characteristics, this model is able to incorporate multi-ﬁrm competi-
tion, two-dimensionality of the geographical region, as well as alternative elasticities of
supply for the agricultural input. The investigation of an input market considering all
these features and their combinations are extensions to existing literature. Hence, the
method allows accounting for critical model assumptions, both in terms of their eﬀect
on the outcome and analytically tractability of the model. Instead of specifying the
model to a particular market to explain certain observations, we conduct simulation
experiments to analyze the impact of model parameters on equilibrium conditions.
Consequently, the present paper can be understood as a ﬁrst explorative approach
towards understanding the interdependencies between location and pricing.
2. Theoretical Background
Let P denote the set of processors and S the set of suppliers (farmers) such that
P = {p|p = 1,2,...,i} and S = {s|s = 1,2,...,j}. Each of them occupies a location








 0 ≤ y ≤ ymax}, and xmax and ymax being the exogenous size of the region. The
maximum distance between two locations is dmax = 1 and other distances are scaled
accordingly, i.e., dLL0 ∈ [0,1], with dLL0 =
q





While D = (dsp)j×i is the distance matrix between suppliers and processors, the mar-













∀p and p 6= p
0. (1)
Processors are free to choose their location Lp = (xp,yp), but suppliers are distributed
in the region according to a density function τ(L) = 1, i.e., there is exactly one supplier
of the input at each point. The transport rate δ is constant. Transport costs between
p and s are δdsp. The local price wp(dsp) of ﬁrm p at point s is deﬁned as a linear price
distance function (Smithies, 1941a):
wp(dsp) = mp − αpδdsp. (2)
While α = [0,1] is a constant portion of the transport costs δdsp, mp is the mill price
at the processor’s location (wp(0) = mp). FOB pricing is characterized by α = 1;
there is no spatial price discrimination because local price diﬀerences reﬂect exactly
the transport costs between diﬀerent locations (Phlips, 1983). Conversely, if α = 0,
2 The formulation can be used for continuous and discrete space. In the simulation model, as used
below, space is discrete in form of a grid of cells. There, the distance between two locations (two
cells) is determined by the shortest distance from one cell’s center to the other.
3the processor uses UD pricing, i.e., there is an identical price over the market area of p.
We denote F = (m,α) as the ﬁrm’s spatial price strategy. We assume that suppliers














 ∀ p ∈ P. (3)
The input producer’s supply function is:
qs = q(w) = w(L)
 with  ≥ 0. (4)
For the moment, we suppose  = 1 but vary this assumption later. Because the
supplier’s location is ﬁxed, the local proﬁt of an individual processor depends on its
location Lp, i.e., the distance to the supplier’s location dsp and its price policy Fp. We
denote γp as p’s strategy, with γ ∈ Γ and Γ = (F,L) = (m,α,x,y). The local proﬁt
depending on the distance to p can be written as:
Πp(s) = (ϕ − w(dsp) − tdsp)qs, (5)
where ϕ is the net price of the ﬁnished good sold by the processor.3 The processor
only purchases the input from locations that yield positive local proﬁts, i.e., ϕ −
w(dsp) − δdsp ≥ 0. Furthermore, the local price wp(dsp) has to be nonnegative, i.e.,
























All suppliers inside the market radius Rp based on Lp can contribute a positive amount
to p’s proﬁt. We deﬁne this set of potential suppliers as:
Cp = {c ∈ S|dcp ≤ Rp}. (7)
Whether c will deliver to p, also depends on the prices of the competitor at Lc. Con-
sequently, the set of actual suppliers Kp is a subset of Cp, with:
Kp = {k ∈ Cp|wp(dkp) ≥ w(dkp0)} ∀ p
0 ∈ P,p 6= p
0. (8)
Additionally, it is:
Kp ⊆ Cp ⊆ S,
Kp ∩ K
0
p = ∅ ∀ p, p
0 ∈ P, p 6= p
0, and





3 Using (2) to substitute for w(·) in (5) and diﬀerentiation with respect to m and α yields the
optimal strategy of the monopsony: OD pricing with F = (0.5,0.5). However, OD pricing is
mostly not optimal under non-cooperative competition.




[ϕ − mp − (1 − α)δdkp](mp − αδdkp), (10)
where γp0 is a vector of the competitors’ strategies.
3. Simulation Model
To analyze this system, i.e., to maximize (10) for each processor subject to its strategy
and the strategies of competitors, we use an agent-based model (ABM). The two
types of economic actors considered in the model are processors and suppliers of an
homogeneous agricultural raw product and their respective objective functions are (10)
and (4). Suppliers are price taker, but processors exhibit (local) market power. The
optimization rule (4) of input producers is to select the highest price at the own location
and set quantity accordingly, and it can easily be implemented by a computer program.
The decision rule of every processor is more complex. The processor’s payoﬀ depends
on the competitors’ strategies according to (10). In this respect, it is well known that
payoﬀs are discontinuous in the competitor’s strategy and pure strategy equilibria fail
to exist, e.g., if ﬁrms locate too close to each other and use FOB pricing (D’Aspremont
et al., 1979) or in the case of competition under UD pricing (Beckmann, 1973; Kats
and Thisse, 1989). Moreover, the two-dimensional and multi-player framework causes
ﬁrst order conditions of (10) to be polynomials of high degrees and analytical (closed
form) solutions do not exist.4 Therefore, to identify (close to) equilibrium strategies in
our general theoretical framework necessitates a powerful and ﬂexible numerical tool.
We apply genetic algorithms (GA), which repeatedly have proven to be successful in
identifying equilibrium strategies in complex games.5
A GA is a stochastic heuristic search method to ﬁnd optimal or close-to-optimal
solutions in large decision or strategy spaces (Mitchell, 1996; Goldberg, 1989). In
analogy to the biological evolution, the principle of GA is based on the survival of the
ﬁttest (Dawid, 1999). During optimization, GA allows for the creation of new, poten-
tially superior solutions, which makes GA eﬃcient and robust, i.e., it minimizes both
the dependency on the initial conditions and makes GA optimization less vulnerable
for local optima lock-in. While GAs have successfully been used over a broad range
of disciplines (Foster, 2001), economic applications to identify equilibria in games in
general and strategic market situations in speciﬁc include Axelrod (1987), Arifovic
(1994), Price (1997), Vallée and Başar (1999), Balmann and Happe (2001), and Alem-
dar and Sirakaya (2003). A more detailed description of the GA and an illustration of
its abilities and precision are given by means of a simple spatial competition example
4 For instance, Tabuchi (1994) uses a conversion of the uniform distribution of consumers in two-
dimensional space to a non-uniform distribution in one-dimensional space, which is not possible
for more than two ﬁrms. A similar diﬃculty regarding the number of ﬁrms aﬀects the analysis
of Brenner (2005). As a result, he uses numerical methods to analyze the location of more
than three ﬁrms in one-dimensional space. Osborne and Pitchik (1987), who characterize mixed
strategy equilibria in the original Hotelling game, as well as Ansari et al. (1998), who extend the
Hotelling model to two- or multi-dimensional space, also use numerical methods.
5 To validate the simulation model in a spatial competition framework, we also used results derived
from theoretical models that include Norman (1981); Kats (1995); Hinloopen and van Marrewĳk
(1999); Zhang and Sexton (2001). The simulation was able to recapitulate these results with
high precision.
5in the supplementary material to this paper.6 In the next section, experiments for dif-
ferent spatial competition scenarios are presented. Thereby, the agent-based approach
provides an instrument to grasp the spatial dimension of a market and the interaction
among spatially diﬀerentiated players within it. Space is represented by a grid of cells
and locations are accessible by x-y coordinates. In order to exclude border eﬀects, it
is feasible to wrap the space by constructing a torus or to analyze the inﬂuences of
border eﬀects by using the simple, quadratic plane. In either case, the normalization
dmax = 1 is maintained. Each cell can be occupied by a number of agents but only
by one producer exactly. This represents the discrete form of the density function
τ(L) = 1.
Because the GA simulation is based on a stochastic process, we get a distribution
for each of the decision variables. Therefore, we separately present a simulation’s
outcome by density plots of location and price policy. In this way, we can easily link
the respective two decision parameters: the location in space via a x-y plot and the
price strategy parameters by a m-α plot. The price policy parameters are discrete with
increments of 10−3 to 10−2. Due to the introduced suppliers’ distribution function and
considerations with respect to processing time, the region, whether or not modeled
as torus, is discrete in space such that X = Y = {0,1,...,20}. Consequently, there
are 400 equidistant points and each of these points is occupied by one farmer. The
processors, however, can locate at any of those 400 points. Within the density plots,
the frequency of variable combinations (either location or price policy) is illustrated
by color. The lighter a point within the x-y or m-α plane, the more frequent the
parameter combination was observed as the outcome of the game. Although partly
caused by the stochastic nature of the algorithm, we may interpret the variability of
the results as evidence whether or not pure-strategy equilibria in location, price policy
or both exists. However, it is not the objective of the paper to characterize equilibria
whether or not in pure or mixed strategies. Instead, we doubt that this is feasible in
all presented cases.
4. Simulation Experiments and Results
The outcome of spatial competition models is very sensitive with respect to the under-
lying assumptions. The objective of the following simulation experiments is to analyze
some of the critical assumptions (both in terms of the outcome and tractability of the
models) in order to extend the understanding of spatial competition. Particularly, we
are interested in the relation between location and spatial price discrimination subject
to transport costs (δ), the number of processors (i), the nature of space, and the price
elasticity of supply functions for the input suppliers. The ﬁrst two points directly
inﬂuence the degree of spatial competition but, as we will see, in a surprisingly dif-
ferent manner. Note that we set the product price ϕ = 1 via normalization. Hence,
normalized transport costs t = δ/ϕ is a relative measure of market competitiveness
(Zhang and Sexton, 2001; Mérel and Sexton, 2010). For instance, t = 0 yields the
classical Bertrand price competition, while suﬃciently high transport costs may lead
to spatially separated monopsonies if processors do not choose to locate at the same
place. Hence, the markets competitiveness decreases with the importance of space td
6 This and other examples as well as a more detailed documentation of the simulation model can
be provided by the corresponding author upon request.
6Table 1. Speciﬁcations of the simulation experiments. Unlisted parameters
are set according to Section 2.
Simulations
Parameter Duopsony Oligopsony Unbounded Space Inelastic supply
i 2 3,...,6 2,...,6 2,...,6
j 400 400 400 400
ϕ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
t 0.0,...,4.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
xmax,ymax 20 20 20 20
e 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
space plane plane torus plane
NoG 6250 3750 3750 3750
i = number of processors, j = number of suppliers, t = normalized transport rate, ϕ = price of
the processed good, xmax,ymax = size of region, e = price elasticity of supply, NoG = number
of analyzed games.
because t, which is exogenous, increases and/or because processors decide to locate
more distant from each other.
In the next sections, simulations are conducted for several selected values of t and
i. In contrast, the supply function and the nature of space are analyzed in two states
only. Regarding the latter, we compare a ﬁnite two-dimensional plane and a ﬁnite
space without borders, i.e., a torus. Furthermore, we estimate the eﬀects of the supply
elasticity by two special cases: unit-elastic supply ( = 1) and unit-supply ( = 0).
Table 1 summarizes the speciﬁcation of the simulations.
4.1. Duopsony
In the ﬁrst experiments, we investigate processors’ decisions regarding the location and
the spatial price policy in duopsony depending on the degree of competition. Figure
2 shows the outcome of the simulations for selected values of transport costs.
The ﬁrst row of density plots in Figure 2 represents the location of the two process-
ing ﬁrms. The lighter the color of a cell the more frequent the location was chosen
during the simulation. The frequency is scaled, i.e., a white colored cell indicates
the maximum while a black one corresponds to zero. Accordingly, the second row
highlights the frequency of the strategy parameter combinations.
From the left to the right, transport costs (importance of space) increase(s), i.e.,
competition decreases. If t = 0, we observe a diﬀuse location distribution. Conversely,
we notice two location equilibria for high transport costs (e.g., t = 4.0). In the
ﬁrst case, the distance between ﬁrms does not matter, while the latter case is the
two-dimensional version of the "touching equilibrium" case as studied in Economides
(1984) or Hinloopen and van Marrewĳk (1999). Instead of location at the quartiles,
as in the one-dimensional touching equilibrium, processors locate at the center of the
opposite region’s quadrants to act as locally separated monopsonists, i.e., if ﬁrm A
7Figure 2. Location (above) and pricing (below) of the duopsony for selected
values of t. Narrow distributions are highlighted by arrows, as in the case
of t = 0.0 where m ≈ 1, while α is uniformly distributed over [0,1].
locates in lower left, B locates in upper right, or if A locates in upper left, B locates in
lower right. In either case, the market radii of both ﬁrms touch at the market center.
Between the two limit cases of t = 0 (perfect competition) and t ≥ 4 (local monop-
sony), spatial diﬀerentiation increases with increasing importance of space (decreasing
market competitiveness). While ﬁrms locate at the center of the market if competition
is ﬁerce (see the second plot in the ﬁrst row of Figure 2, t = 1), the distance between
both ﬁrms increases once transport costs become more important. Additionally, we
observe a relation between the the second part of the ﬁrms’ strategy, the spatial price
policy, and the intensity of spatial competition. This is shown in the second row of
Figure 2. Again, the ﬁrst plot represents t = 0. In this case, α does not inﬂuence local
prices and is not essential for proﬁt maximization. The observed uniform distribution
of α at the right edge of the ﬁgure (marked by the arrows in t = 0) is caused by the
random initialization of the decision variables within the simulations. As expected,
the optimal strategy corresponds to Bertrand competition with m = ϕ = 1.
If t > 0 but is suﬃciently low, e.g., t = 1, high mill prices accompanied with
high α values (low price discrimination) are observed, i.e., processors use close to
FOB pricing. With increasing transport costs and spatial diﬀerentiation, we observe
increasing spatial price discrimination but decreasing mill prices. If t ≥ 4, both ﬁrms
can operate as local monopsonists given the respective choice of location and use the
proﬁt maximizing OD price regime with F = (m,α) = (0.5,0.5).
4.2. Oligopsony
The transport costs, measured by t, are one important parameter inﬂuencing com-
petition in spatial markets. In the previous section, lower values for t increase the
competitive pressure on processors because the relation between the importance of
space td and the value of the ﬁnished good (which was set to one) decreases. In this
section, we discuss the case of increasing competition due to an increasing number of
processors i. More ﬁrms diminish the (average) inter-ﬁrm distance and appear like
a reduction of t. However, the number of competitors crucially aﬀects the market
8Figure 3. Location (top) and pricing (bottom) of the oligopsony. The case
of two to six ﬁrms. The ﬁrst row illustrates the ﬁrms’ locations, while the
second row highlights the frequency of the price strategy parameters.
structure such that some ﬁrms may face competition in more than one direction while
others do not.
Simulations are conducted for three to six ﬁrms. In each scenario, t = 2 to high-
light the pure inﬂuence of i. Figure 3 shows the outcomes for the location-price-policy
game. The case of two ﬁrms is pictured to compare the duopsony with the oligopsony
outcomes. Again, the upper row provides information where the ﬁrms locate. Ob-
viously, independent of i, the square seems to be the general location pattern. Yet,
depending on i, ﬁrms locate at the angles, on the (middle of) edges, or even close to
the market center. These cases are discussed below. The robustness of the general
location pattern, however, is not surprising because the market region is modeled as
square. This is particularly intuitive in the case of four ﬁrms.
In the case of i = 3, the simulation data reveal that the locations of the three ﬁrms
coincide with corners of a triangle as depicted yellow in the location plot. By the
rotation of this triangle, we obtain four typical location equilibria in total. Thereby,
two ﬁrms locate at neighboring angles of the general location pattern. We denote
these locations as La. The third ﬁrm locates midpoint on the opposite segment of
the general location pattern and we denote this location Le. Considering the ﬁrm’s
price policy, depicted in the lower row of Figure 3, we ﬁnd that a ﬁrm located at Le
uses a price strategy Fe = (me,αe) which consists of m-α combinations from the ﬁrst
quadrant (upper left) of the price strategy plot. These strategies are characterized
by both high m and α. Conversely, the lower right quadrant’s policies feature higher
price discrimination (lower α values) and correspondingly lower mill prices. These
strategies, which we denote Fa, are employed by ﬁrms located at La. These results
are remarkable because they illustrate the relation between pricing and location as
well as make the potential of agent-based modeling apparent. We observe not only
heterogeneity in location but also diﬀerentiated price strategies.
The scenarios with four and ﬁve ﬁrms show a high variability but no clear diﬀeren-
tiation of price strategies. While strategies for i = 4 are mostly located in the fourth
quadrant (high price discrimination), the m-a combinations are spread over the ﬁrst
and fourth quadrant for i = 5. If we plot the corresponding α values of the latter
9case pursuant to the coordinates, we notice that locations in the center of the square
pattern are linked to high price discrimination (low α-values). Centrally located ﬁrms
face ﬁerce competition in each direction, while peripherally located ﬁrms have more
local market power. These results are in line with Economides (1984) or Brenner
(2005). The authors observe a U-shaped price structure in the FOB pricing oligopoly
with a linear market, i.e., FOB mill prices are high at the market’s edge and decrease
with decreasing distance to the market’s center. However, our results highlight market
power of peripheral ﬁrms by lower price discrimination.
Although of less magnitude, we also observe diﬀerentiation of price strategies for
i = 6. Frequency peaks are in the ﬁrst and fourth quadrant of the price policy plot
of Figure 3. Thereby, four ﬁrms occupy the angles of the square, i.e, the general
location pattern, and two ﬁrms are oppositely located at the margin. The latter face
competition in two directions and use the strategies of the fourth quadrant.
4.3. Unbounded Space
Most of the one-dimensional models of location or product diﬀerentiation are based
on Hotelling’s ﬁnite line market with boundaries (Economides, 1993; Ansari et al.,
1998; Brenner, 2005). This is an intuitive assumption because there is almost always
a minimum and maximum of a quality or some kind of market border. However, bor-
der eﬀects may not only cause analytical diﬃculties but may also lead to qualitative
diﬀerent model predictions. For instance, Salop (1979) and Kats (1995) investigate a
circular market framework. While Salop (1979) assumes symmetric location equilib-
ria, Kats (1995) proofs their existence. Under a two-dimensional framework, we use
a torus where (x,y) = ({0,1,...,xmax},{0,1,...,ymax}) and locations with the coor-
dinates (x,0) and (0,y) are direct neighbors of (x,ymax) and (xmax,y), respectively.
Even though this construct is a strong abstraction, particularly with respect to spatial
markets, it facilitates the analysis of spatial competition when ﬁrms always have a
neighbor in each direction.
Figure 4 shows the outcome for the ﬁnite market without boundaries. Note that the
location of one ﬁrm is ﬁxed at (x,y) = (0,ymax) to make the location pattern visible.7
In the case of two ﬁrms, we observe maximum diﬀerentiation and OD pricing. While
the location is robust over t, the price strategy is caused by t = 2. The maximum
distance in the market is dmax = 1.8 Firms can act as locally separated monopsonies
if dt ≥ 2 because it must hold that 4R∗ ≥ dmax, and R∗ is the monopsonistic market
radius given by a price policy F = (1/2,1/2) and (6). We note that there is a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between this case and the outcome of t = 2 in Figure 2. In the bounded
market, the maximum distance is between two opposing corners. Accordingly, if the
ﬁrms locate inside the market d < dmax, and to have td = 2 requires, e.g., location at
the quartiles of a diagonal and t = 4. Consequently, we can compare the case of t = 2
in this section with the outcome of t = 4 of Figure 2.
7 If we consider the torus (or a circular market), instead of the actual location the distance between
the ﬁrms is crucial. As a result, if there is one location equilibrium, there is an inﬁnite number of
location equilibria because the addition of the same vector to each of the ﬁrms’ locations yields
another location equilibrium.
8 Note that the maximum distance in the market under the torus is, e.g., between the market
center and a corner.
10Figure 4. Location and pricing of the oligopsony in unbounded space
(torus). In the location ﬁgures: cells at the upper edge are direct neighbors
of cells at the lower edge. The same is true for the left and right edge. The
location of one ﬁrm is ﬁxed at the upper left corner with (x,y) = (0,ymax). In
cases of multiple location equilibria, typical constellations are exempliﬁed.
The next three ﬁgures (i = 3,...,5) show increasing competition given a constant
transport rate but an increasing number of competitors. The distribution of the loca-
tion parameters highlight the ﬁrms’ attempt to locate equidistantly.9 We can identify
multiple location equilibria in almost all ﬁgures. The location of the ﬁrms is illustrated
by geometrical forms as highlighted yellow in the particular scenarios but also by the
rotation or shift of these forms. If i = 5, the ﬁrms’ locations are on two parallel straight
lines. Note that the upper left and lower right corner represent one location (the same
ﬁrm). The algorithm is not able to ﬁnd a stable location pattern if i > 5. Considering
the price strategies, we identify increasing spatial price discrimination with increasing
competition. In contrast to bounded space, price strategies that are characterized by
high α values are not observed.
The identiﬁcation of increasing price discrimination with increasing competition is
in sharp contrast to the results in the previous section. This clearly highlights how
the construction of space inﬂuences the model’s outcome. The implications regarding
the spatial analysis as well as the investigation of product diﬀerentiation cannot be
neglected. In this regard, the present study is a generalization of Economides (1993)
or Brenner (2005) who attribute border eﬀects signiﬁcant impact on results in the
case of one-dimensional space under FOB pricing. Conversely, in almost all models of
spatial price competition, addressing the question regarding the optimal price policy
under competition, a line market is assumed where two ﬁrms are located at the end
points (Kats and Thisse, 1989; Espinosa, 1992; Zhang and Sexton, 2001). While this
structure is consistent with circular markets as studied by Salop (1979) or Kats (1995),
the presence of some kind of border or limit might be an intuitive feature of spatial
markets as well as markets of diﬀerentiated products. Nevertheless, both types of
space might be appropriate for diﬀerent questions and particular for diﬀerent markets,
9 Slight deviations from equidistant locations are caused by the discrete nature of the space. To
relocate, a ﬁrm has to increment either its x or y variable at least by one.
11but one has to be aware that one or the other structure signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the
prediction of the model.
4.4. Perfectly Inelastic Supply
If supply is elastic, producers can mitigate a potentially negative eﬀect of higher lo-
cal input prices on a ﬁrm’s proﬁt by rising local supply. This supply eﬀect is not
present under perfectly inelastic supply functions, which signiﬁcantly alters the re-
sults. If we consider unit-supply within the simulation model where the producer’s
reservation price is zero, we identify a typical location pattern in form of a square but
less distinctive relative to previous experiments. We can also observe that prices (price
discrimination) increase (decreases) in tendency with increasing competition, i.e., with
an increasing number of competitors. Beside these observations, however, we are not
able to identify location equilibria in this setting. Additionally, price strategies are
distributed over a wide range of m-α combinations. Both results are not surprising. If
supply is perfectly inelastic, it is well known that equilibria in pure strategies do not
exist (D’Aspremont et al., 1979). However, the observation of a wide variety of price
and location strategies also supports the conclusion that price discrimination crucially
depends on spatial diﬀerentiation, i.e., the relative location of competitors.
5. Summary and Discussion
The main ﬁndings of the simulations are summarized by Table 2. For instance, we
observe increasing (decreasing) spatial price discrimination (α-values) with increasing
normalized transport costs under duopsony as well as an increasing number of com-
petitors under oligopsony. However, the competitiveness of the market diﬀers in both
cases, i.e., it increases with i but decreases with t.
For comparable assumptions, our results are supported by existing theoretical in-
vestigations of partial aspects of the competition model as presented in this paper.
This validates the model. For example, Smithies (1941b) and Eaton (1972) show that
non-cooperative competition and elastic demand yields incentives for (close to) central
locations in the Hotelling model; Zhang and Sexton (2001) also yield mixed pricing
in equilibrium over some range of spatial diﬀerentiation in the duopsony; Economides
(1993) and Brenner (2005) also show that depending on location, some ﬁrms may ex-
hibit relatively higher local market power; and, as we observe maximum diﬀerentiation
in unbounded two-dimensional space, Kats (1995) gets this result for circular markets.
Additionally, there is empirical evidence. For instance, the survey of Greenhut (1981)
shows a variety of pricing in reality and we observe most of them in the simulations.
In general, we can explain our results with diﬀerent eﬀects caused by the ﬂexible
adaptation of linear price strategies and the endogenous choice of location. Both repre-
sents a signiﬁcant extension to previous price-location models. For instance, consider
the case of close to minimum diﬀerentiation under duopsony (t = 1). The observed
price strategy ensures high prices at the market border between both processors. This
competitive eﬀect protects proximate locations from overbidding by the competitor.
At the same time, high local prices at proximate locations facilitate high supply eﬀects
where it is most proﬁtable (due to low transport costs) and low price discrimination
secures large market areas (market area eﬀect) under high mill prices because suppli-
12Table 2. Outcome of the simulation experiments.
Duopsony Oligopsony Unbounded space Inelastic supply
Variable:
transport number number number
costs of ﬁrms of ﬁrms of ﬁrms
m H  H N
α H  H N
d N H H H
m = processor’s mill price at its location, α = share of transport costs in local prices, β = degree
of spatial price discrimination, d = average distance between processors, H = decreasing, N =
increasing,  = indeterminate.
ers bear most of the transport costs. Consequently, the processor eﬃciently competes
against the proximate rival and accesses remote locations in the direction where no
other processor is located. We call these regions the hinterland of a processor.
Another example is the case of the oligopsony where some ﬁrms use higher price
discriminating strategies than others (e.g., if i = 3 or i = 6). Under the chosen loca-
tions, these processors face ﬁerce competition in more than one direction. Therefore,
the competitive eﬀect of pricing is the driving force. Firms discriminate against proxi-
mate suppliers to set higher prices at more distant locations. Conversely, if processors
occupy a location with signiﬁcant hinterland, they face less intense competition. The
price strategy decision of these ﬁrms to opt for less price discrimination is driven by
the market area eﬀect.
The presented simulation experiments cover a wide range of observations in agri-
cultural markets. For instance, markets for raw milk, meat packing, or fruit and veg-
etables feature spatially distributed production and processing as well as high price
discrimination (cf. Durham et al., 1996; Alvarez et al., 2000; Graubner et al., 2011).
Our results under oligopsony are consistent with these observations. Equally, we ob-
serve FOB pricing in markets where more than one processor locates at the same
location as in the case of grain delivered to harbors, the shipment of fresh produce to
traditional terminal markets (e.g., Sexton et al., 1991) or to one of multiple packing
houses located in close proximity to intense growing regions (e.g., Cho, 2004). Gal-
lagher et al. (2005) identify diﬀerent pricing strategies of ethanol plants and our results
can explain this observation with the intensity of local competition.
6. Conclusion
We investigate spatial competition from an input market perspective because trans-
port costs and spatial distribution of supply and demand are key aspects for many
markets of agricultural products and renewable resources. Unlike previous studies, we
consider spatial diﬀerentiation (location of ﬁrms) and spatial price discrimination (spa-
tial pricing of ﬁrms) endogenous. Our approach accommodates a much more general
depiction of spatial competition than prior work, including two-dimensional spatial
markets, competition among multiple ﬁrms, and elastic input supply functions. To
13surmount the problem of analytical intractability, we use a computational approach
by combining agent-based modeling with genetic algorithms.
While results considerably diﬀer from previous studies, they are widely consistent
with what we observe in agricultural markets including spatially dispersed production
and processing and the prevalence of spatial price discrimination in processor’s pricing
strategies. The particular aim of the paper is to provide a ﬁrst investigation of what
is or could be possible and where might it be helpful. We showed that there are a
number of conditions which need to be considered, and often we do not even know how
alternative formulations of these assumptions or their combination aﬀect the prediction
of a spatial competition model. Important issues of spatial economics are the ﬁrm’s
location and the nature of price competition in space. We addressed how the one
aﬀects the other subject to critical model assumptions. Our results clearly highlight
that spatial competition models need to be carefully speciﬁed.
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